Over the course of the past centuries, many philosophers have sat down to write theories presenting their views on government. Of these, the works of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, John Rawls, and David Gauthier are regarded as having a major impact on the thinking of society today. In examining these works we must look at the rights and duties they ascribe to individuals and government, and consider these rights and duties in the context of the author's underlying justification.
First to write his theories on government, Hobbes seems to justify the ascription of rights on his ``Right of Nature,'' the right to self-preservation. Hobbes says that this right is a ``precept, or generall rule of reason'' (Hobbes 190). From this fundamental right, Hobbes derives many rights and duties. In the state of nature Hobbes says that every man has a right to every thing, because ``there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemyes'' (189-190). Hobbes second law of nature lays the basis for creation of a commonwealth, requiring ``That a man be willing, when others are too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things'' (190). Hobbes says that in a commonwealth the sovereign has a duty to defend the populace, and that ``he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence'' (228). Hobbes says that those in a commonwealth have no right to rebel, yet he holds the right to self-defense above even this, saying that though rebellion is unjustified, those who have already rebelled are fully justified in defending their lives - ``For they but defend their lives, which the Guilty may as well do, as the Innocent'' (270).
Taking the theory of Hobbes and building upon it, Locke holds not only self-preservation fundamental, but also the preservation of all of humanity. Locke says that man ``has not liberty to destroy himself'' and therefore is ``bound to preserve himself'' (Locke 9). Likewise, ``when his own preservation comes not into competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind'' (9). In order that the law of nature not be violated, Locke gives every man in the state of nature the ``right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation'' (9). Locke gives those injured by violations of the law of nature ``a particular right to seek reparation from him that has done it'' (11). Locke goes so far as to say that this gives man the right to kill a thief, for by the thief's ``using force, where he has no right, to get me into his power, let his pretence be what it will, I have no right to suppose, that he, would would take away my liberty, would not, when he had me in his power, take away everything else'' (15). Locke assigns to each man as a right ``the labour of his body, and the work of his hands'' (19). This work provides the foundation for private property - ``Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property'' (19). In keeping with his fundamental assertion that man must preserve all humanity, Locke tempers this right to private property by saying that man may only take property out of the common if he leaves ``enough, and as good'' for others (19). Though Locke says that all men have equal right, he recognizes that some do not have equal ability to care for themselves, and therefore puts upon parents the ``obligation to preserve, nourish, and educate the children they had begotten'' (32). Like Hobbes, Locke says that society is entered in order that men may enjoy ``comfortable, safe, and peaceful living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it'' (52). Locke too holds the right of preservation as a right more fundamental than obligation to any government - ``Whenever the legistlators endeavour to take away, and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under an arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any further obedience'' (111).
In the work of Rawls we find a different justification for the ascription of rights and duties. Rawls says that in order to draw up a list of basic liberties, ``we consider what liberties provide the political and social conditions essential for adequate development and full exercise of the two moral powers of free and equal persons'' (Rawls 45). These powers he defines to be ``the capacity for a sense of justice'' and ``a capacity for a conception of the good'' (18-19). Each basic right or liberty granted by Rawls can be clearly traced back to one of these two powers. The ``constituent powers'' - ``the right to vote and hold office, ... so-called bills of rights,'' and the power to amend the constitution - Rawls holds as ``crucial'' and ``urgent'' (46). These rights are the foundation of the first moral power. Along with them, Rawls ascribes under the first moral power the rights to ``equal political liberties and freedom of thought'' (112). Rawls says that these are necessary to ``ensure the opportunity for the free and informed application of the principles of justice to that structure and to its policies by means of the full and effective exercise of citizens' sense of justice'' (112-113). The second moral power Rawls holds secondary to the first, saying that it cannot exist without an environment which satisfies the conditions of the first power. Under this second power Rawls ascribes citizens the right ``to view their persons as independent from and not identified with any particular conception of the good, or scheme of final ends'' (21). Without this freedom there could be no freedom of religion, or freedom of political doctrine, for without the right to legally exist seperately from these views a person would be sufficiently discouraged from taking any view other than the established norm. Also under the second moral power Rawls places the rights of ``liberty of conscience and freedom of association,'' two powers inherently tied to the previous argument (113).
The arguments of Gauthier set out to establish an entirely different goal, and therefore utilize a very different justification for rights. Gauthier initially ascribes to each person the right to ``her basic endowment as what she can make use of, and what no one else could make use of in her absense'' (Gauthier 100). On top of this Gauthier declares that ``A person is free in so far as she is able, without interference, to direct her capacities to the service of her preferences'' (90). At this stage a summary of Gauthier's justification of rights would read that an individual has a right to do whatever she pleases. Yet this cannot be the case, for as Gauthier says, ``the existence of other persons, and the possibilities of exchange, affect the limits on each person's behaviour'' (91). To reconsile the right to freedom of action with the rights of other individuals Gauthier adds the Lockean proviso, the concept of ``enough, and as good left ... for others'' (192). For Locke, the proviso applies only to property, but Gauthier says that ``we treat [the proviso] as a general constraint, by which we may move from a Hobbesian state of nature, in which there are no exclusive rights whatsoever but only liberties, to the initial position for social interaction'' (208). Therefore a crude summary of Gauthier's full justification might read that a person has the right to do whatever she pleases, so long as the pursuit of these pleasures does not infringe on the rights of others.
The four authors discussed here provide very differing justifications for the rights and duties they ascribe to individuals. Obviously none have reached a perfectly satisfactory justification, or development would have ceased at such a point. And so the question that must be asked is, can there every be a fully satisfactory justification for rights, given their nature? In the end all attempts at justification, however well reasoned, must fall into the realm of opinion and conjecture. There is no magic bell to sound when a perfect answer has been reached, therefore people of differing opinions will always be able to argue the merit of their own brand of justification.
Social contract theory is particularly palatable to modern western thought given its adherence to ideals associated with democracy. Westerners are highly enamoured with the concept of choice, and as such are in favor of an underlying theory of governmental justification that holds to the ideals in which they believe. Social contract theory does a good job of explaining many things about societal interactions, and therefore its continued development is inherently in the best interest of our world.