From the monarchy of England to the democracy of America, social contract theory has provided a broad basis for the justification of governmental powers. Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, John Rawls, and David Gauthier all set out with very different purposes in mind, yet all based their claims on this same theory. Though the different social contract theorists may come to very different conclusions when determining what form of government parties would choose from the original position, the underlying flexibility and power of the social contract theory allows it to base all their arguments.
Hobbes, the first to write his work, writes Leviathan in order to justify the absolute monarchy. Hobbes is writing around the time of the English Civil War, and sees the damage rebellion has done to the nation. Leviathan is a response to the war, a means of justifying the king's rightful claim to the throne, while showing that rebellion is always unjustified. Hobbes does this by shaping the state of nature to be a horrible place, utterly devoid of order -- "every man is Enemy to every man; ... men live without other security, than that which their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish" (Hobbes 186). Hobbes says that men do not desire this war, and their reason draws them to "Articles of Peace ... which otherwise are called the Lawes of Nature" (188). It is the second fundamental law of nature -- "That a man be willing, when others are too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things" -- that leads to the creation of society, but this laying down of rights must involve all men, for "if other men will not lay down their Right, as well as he; then there is no Reason for any one, to devest himselfe of his" (190). The desolation of the state of nature causes the greatest aim of the social contract to be the establishment of a stable government, which is unlikely to collapse. All but the strongest parties enter into the agreement with very little property to show for themselves, for although Hobbes says that every man has the right to everything -- "there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemyes" -- the constant turmoil assures that few will keep hold of what they take (189-190). Hobbes eschews the democracy and oligarchy, preferring instead the absolute monarchy. He says "the difference between these three kindes of Common-wealth, consisteth not in the difference of Power; but in the difference of Convenience, or Aptitude to produce the Peace, and Security of the people" (241). Hobbes claims that a monarch is more likely to follow the wishes of the people, because "the riches, powers, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects" (241-242).
Locke too writes from a British revolution, but his Second Treatise of Government is used to argue against the absolute monarchy, and for a limited monarchy and civil rights. Locke takes a very different view of the state of nature than that of Hobbes. He says it is a "state of perfect freedom," and one in which equality demands "mutual love among men" (Locke 8). The law of nature requires the preservation of mankind, and the power to execute this law is placed into every man's hands. Therefore, Locke's state of nature exists in a kind of equilibrium, where the fear of punishment warns against malicious deeds. It is because of this view of a gentler state of nature that Locke can make very different claims about the social contract. Unlike the parties of Hobbes, for whom any society is better than the state of nature, the parties of Locke are in much less urgent need of society, and therefore they're unwilling to accept regimes that are less than optimal. Also unlike Hobbes, any number of parties can enter into the agreement, for "it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature" (52). The parties that enter into Locke's agreement are likely much more varied than those of Hobbes, since Locke allows those in the state of nature to take private property by putting their labor to it -- "Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property" (19). This right to appropriate out of the common does not come without constraint, however, as man is only allowed to take that which he can use -- "As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is beyond this is more than his share, and belongs to others" (21). It would seem, then, that similar needs would lead to each person having similar amounts of property, but the creation of money allows man to "fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus gold and silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to anyone" (29). The major problem in Locke's state of nature, and the main reason why men enter into society, is the lack of a common judge to uniformly arbitrate disputes. Locke says that the goal of civil society is "to avoid, and remedy those inconveniences of the state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man's being judge in his own case" (48). Locke says that this society can have any form of government, so long as that government is not an absolute monarchy. In an absolute monarchy there is no judge for the monarch, and therefore the monarch "is as much in the state of nature, all under his dominion, as he is with the rest of mankind" and his subjects are "degraded from the common state of rational creatures" in that they no longer have the right to be the judge of their own cases (48 - 49).
Rawls, likely due in no small part to his contemporary status, takes a much more modern approach to political justification. In his work Justice as Fairness, Rawls sets out to create justice separate from any moral or religious doctrine, showing that even people of disparate beliefs can agree upon the basic tenets of democratic society. The parties to Rawls' agreement are not coming from the state of nature, but from a theoretical original position. Rawls acknowledges that this original position never really occurred, but says that this "means what principles the parties would agree to is to be decided by analysis" and not by historical conjecture (Rawls 17). Rawls takes a novel approach to the original position, hiding the parties behind what he calls the veil of ignorance. As he says it, "the veil of ignorance removes differences in bargaining advantages, so that in this and other respects the parties are symmetrically situated" (87). It does this by making each party represent another in the bargaining, while giving the bargainer no information about the party that they are representing. In this way the veil of ignorance strives to create a fair situation for all parties. Because the parties have no knowledge of the social or economic status of the person they represent, they are compelled to chose social properties by which the least possible outcome is as great as possible. Rawls calls this the minimax principle.
In Morals by Agreement, Gauthier takes a somewhat similar approach to that of Rawls, by setting out "to provide a justificatory framework for moral behavior" (2). He does this not by showing that morals are required by God, or a basic human condition, but instead that the moral thing to do is the rational thing to do. Gauthier's version of the state of nature is an environment where people make decisions based solely on the maximization of their preference -- "Heretofore we have supposed that each person forms expectations about the choices of others to which she responds ... [considering] only the costs and benefits to herself" (116). Morality requires movement away from this individual choice, putting "a constraint on each person's pursuit of his own interest." (8). Gauthier says that morality "emerges quite simply from the application of the maximizing conception to certain structures of interaction. Agreed mutual constraint is the rational response to these structures" (9). Given this, Gauthier sets out to show "that co-operation is a rational mode of interaction," and, therefore, that it is the moral thing to do (118). Gauthier poses the "initial bargaining position," from which all admissible outcomes are derived (130). This initial bargaining position represents the position of each participant in the bargain before any gains, with each having only "what she brings to the bargaining table" (130). Next, Gauthier argues that the rational choice in a co-operative bargain is to select the optimum outcome conforming to the principle of minimax relative concession. This he defines by saying that, given multiple outcomes, the outcome is chosen whose greatest relative concession is as small as possible, or whose minimum relative concession is no larger than the greatest relative concession of any other outcome (137). Though at times this may lead to smaller individual gain than might have been possible, this co-operation is rational because it maximizes average gain while minimizing average concession, leading to a better overall situation.
Each author's theory has the common attribute of presupposing that people are rational, and would be compelled to agree with a rational theory. The theories present themselves as the rational choice, therefore as rational people we would see that they are in our best interest, and necessarily agree to them. Many who have commented on the works of Locke and Hobbes have debated whether or not the two used the state of nature as a hypothetical or not, and yet in the end this is irrelevant. If the theories would have had the weight to gather agreement from those coming from the state of nature, their appeal to ration should also insure that they are strong enough to be compelling today.
Social contract theory is not the sole class of theory to attempt and justify societal rights and duties. Natural law, of which social contract theory is often considered an offshoot, bases its justification of rights and duties on laws that are supposed to be fundamental to humanity. Locke and Hobbes both turn to natural rights when defining their states of nature, talking of the fundamental law of nature. Locke, in claiming that people have a duty to preserve themselves, turns to religious support, saying that all are “the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business” (Locke 9). This duty is not one that has been agreed to, instead it is one that is inherent, and a requirement no matter what system might be chosen. Not all social contract, however, has its basis in natural rights theory. Gauthier in particular sets out with the purpose of not allowing anything to be fundamental, and instead reasoning his entire theory in logic and ration.
Another popular theory is that of utilitarianism, which all four authors reject. Utilitarian views hold something to be better if it increases society’s overall utility. This viewpoint holds no room for the individual, instead focusing solely on society as a whole. Thought it is this characteristic which makes the utilitarian theory unpalatable to all four authors, each would reject this theory in a different way. Hobbes, for instance, might argue against a utilitarian philosophy by saying that the disenfranchisement of the lower class is sure to cause unrest, and therefore runs counter to his fundamental goal of stability. Rawls, on the other hand, argues against utilitarianism because, among other things, “one comprehensive doctrine can be maintained only by the oppressive use of state power, with all its official crimes and the inevitable brutalities and cruelties” (Rawls 34). This imposition of doctrine would impinge upon every citizen’s rights to form their own conception of the good. The social contract theorist can point to opinion of the majority in support of his theory, and therefore hold his theory on a sort of moral higher level.
The only real argument against social contract theory is that it is merely that -- a theory -- and not something that could possibly be applied to real life. For in real life we see these supposedly rational people, whose support the social contract theorists would purport to gather, doing utterly irrational things. Is the supposition that people are naturally given to rational thought really supportable given all the real-world examples that seem to point to the contrary? Yet, suppose a social contract theorist were to grant that, yes, at times people do not follow the rules of rational behavior. Does this really change anything about the claim that would be made for the validity of the theory? For society to function correctly, it must be guided by rational thought. Therefore, an appeal to rational thought can never be negated by the presence of irrational behavior.
Social contract theory has now been around for several hundred years. It has been examined, picked apart, argued, and strained. And yet, still it survives. Surely this in and of itself is the greatest testament to its worth. For who can argue against an idea so fundamentally simple as the power to govern coming from the consent of the governed? Social contract theory appeals to the sense of fairness, and the sense of justice, and therefore will never become obsolete.